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Abstract
We analyze the removal of the credit-risk guarantees provided by the government-
sponsored enterprises (GSEs) in a model with agents heterogeneous in income and house
price risk. We find that wealth inequality increases, driven by higher mortgage spreads
and housing rents. Housing holdings become more concentrated. Foreclosures fall. The
removal benefits high-income households, while hurting low- and mid-income households
(renters and highly leveraged mortgagors with conforming loans). GSE reform requires
compensating transfers, sufficiently high elasticity of rental supply, or linking GSE reform
with the elimination of the mortgage interest deduction. (JEL E51, H81, G21, R2)
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1
Introduction
Reforming the housing finance system is a pressing policy issue in the United States, but
recent proposals have failed to gain Congressional support.1 The status quo is that the federal
government, directly or indirectly, insures the credit risk of most of the mortgage market.2
Most policy reforms propose a dramatic size reduction of the government-sponsored enterprises
(GSEs). The effect of the policy on inequality is a key element of the debate.
In this paper, we study the distributional implications of the GSEs. We analyze a quanti-
tative general equilibrium model with endogenous mortgage spreads and agents heterogenous
in idiosyncratic income, housing tenure choices, and idiosyncratic house value shocks. To focus
on distributional questions, we abstract from aggregate shocks, which are a key element in
the business-cycle analysis of Elenev, Landvoigt, and Van Nieuwerburgh (2016). We model all
aspects of current U.S. housing policy relevant to studying inequality (FHA, GSE, and jumbo
loans, mortgage interest deductibility, guarantee fees, progressive taxes, and social transfers).
This paper is novel because it integrates the aforementioned elements with the GSE-credit-
risk subsidy model. Lenders pay a guarantee fee (g-fee) to the GSEs, which cover lenders’ credit
losses in case of borrower default. The literature analyzing the distributional implications of the
GSEs have, so far, only focused on funding subsidies. That is, the GSEs have funding advantages
that they pass to mortgage lenders and then to mortgagors. A funding subsidy works through
the liability side of a lender’s balance sheet; a credit-risk subsidy operates through the asset
side. We show that this makes a difference when studying inequality. Ample evidence supports
that the GSEs provide a subsidy for credit risk. For example, the Congressional Budget Office
(CBO) and several authors have shown that the GSEs’ guarantees are underpriced. For this
reason, the CBO inputs the credit subsidies into the federal budget (CBO 2013; Lucas and
McDonald 2010).
The model captures the different mortgage choices available to households and the housing
tenure decision. Since all households have the same preferences, the renters are the low-income,
low-wealth households who do not qualify for credit or prefer not to borrow given their credit
conditions. The remaining households want to buy a house because it provides housing services,
it has collateral value, it is an investment asset with positive excess return relative to the
deposit rate and because mortgage interest rates are tax deductible. However, because there is
a minimum size, housing prices are high relative to income and most households need credit to
1For example, the U.S. Congress failed to approve the Corker-Warner bill and the Johnson-Crapo bill. The
Obama administration put forward a white paper, but it was abandoned.
2For example, in 2014, the GSEs insured about 50% of the market, whereas other programs, such as the
FHA, VA, RD, and PIH loans, insured around 20% of the market.
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buy a house.
In the absence of government guarantees, the mortgage rate is banks’ cost of funds (the
deposit rate and origination costs) plus a mortgage spread that increases with the mortgagor’s
credit risk. This risk decreases with households’ wealth, both in the model and in the data
from the Survey of Consumer Finances. That is, low wealth households have higher debt-to-
house value (DTV) and debt-to-income (DTI) ratios.3 FHA and GSE guarantees provide a
larger subsidy to those households with larger default risk. Thus, there are large cross-sectional
differences on who benefits from the credit-risk subsidies. The average subsidy estimated in the
housing finance literature (and that we match in the model) does not capture this substantial
heterogeneity.
Closing the GSEs has a direct effect on GSEs’ borrowers, and it triggers several general
equilibrium effects. First, the direct effect is that GSE borrowers (who are usually mid-income,
mid-wealth households with roughly 80% loan-to-value) lose their credit subsidy and move either
to the rental market, or to FHA or jumbo mortgages. Both of these mortgages have spreads
higher than GSE-insured mortgages, and these households cut their borrowing.4 Second, lower
demand for credit implies that deposit rates (the risk-free rate in our model) fall in order
to decrease the supply of savings. Third, because the net flow among households is from
homeownership to renting, housing rents increase and housing prices fall. Fourth, removing the
GSEs lowers default rates and the deadweight costs from foreclosures. Thus, the economy has
more output available for consumption. Fifth, since the government does not have to absorb
the GSEs’ credit losses, it can rebate those savings to households through lower taxes or higher
transfers.
Who wins and who loses from the removal of the GSEs depends on the exposure of house-
holds to each of the previous channels. Renters suffer because rents increase, the return on
their deposits is lower, and they can no longer expect a large credit subsidy from becoming
a GSE-insured mortgagor. Mid-income households who are FHA borrowers enjoy lower hous-
ing prices and a drop in mortgage rates because deposit rates fall. However, they lose the
possibility of transitioning to GSEs’ mortgages with lower rates. Mid-income households who
are high-leverage GSE mortgagors suffer the most because their mortgage spreads increase the
most. High-income households who borrow in the jumbo market are the main winners from
3Mortgage spreads depend on DTI because, in the model, lenders have partial recourse to borrower’s income.
Frame, Gerardi, and Tracy (2016) discuss that income levels (and related variables as the FICO score) are priced
in mortgage spreads, even without recourse, because income affects default decisions, such as through its link
to the cost of default.
4Removing the GSEs increases average mortgage rates by 22 bp. Elenev, Landvoigt, and Van Nieuwerburgh
(2016) obtain a similar result.
3
the removal. Their spreads are not affected and their mortgage rates decrease as lenders pass
on their lower deposit rates. Lower price-to-rent ratios and return on deposits make it more
attractive to be a landlord. High-income households shift their portfolios toward housing. How-
ever, if the drop in deposit rates is large enough then the welfare of wealthy households with
large holdings of deposits may decrease. We compare alternative modeling choices that alter
the strength of the different channels.
The previous discussion implies an uneven distribution of the welfare gains or losses from
eliminating the GSEs. However, some channels are beneficial for everybody. (1) Average
leverage decreases, although the cross-sectional distribution of leverage changes: low- and mid-
income mortgagors decrease leverage while high-income mortgagors increase it. Every household
benefits from an economy with less deadweight losses from default. (2) Everyone benefits from
the government lowering taxes or increasing transfers. Nevertheless, these channels are not
strong enough to compensate the low- and mid-income households who lose from the removal
of the GSEs.
Wealth inequality measured by the Gini index increases when the GSEs are removed. Most
of the increase is due to higher housing costs (higher rents or larger mortgage payments) and
lower return on savings of the low and mid-income households. These households need to devote
some of their previous savings to cover the higher housing costs, which lowers their ability to
accumulate wealth. This is especially important for previous GSE borrowers who pass from
paying a mortgage and accumulating housing wealth to paying rents and not accumulating
any wealth. Moreover, as deposit savings lose value, the wealthy households can shift their
portfolios toward housing (because the return from being a landlord is higher). The low and
mid-income households cannot do this because access to and cost of mortgage credit act as
entry barriers. Housing holdings therefore become more concentrated.
If the supply of rental housing is not elastic enough (for example, if landlords are mom-and-
pop investors unable to diversify housing risk) then we find that most households oppose the
removal of the GSEs. This result may explain why all proposals to reduce the guarantees have
so far failed. Most renters and leveraged homeowners are against the removal. The median
wealth of the households who favor the reform is about three times larger than the median
wealth of the households who oppose it.
GSE reform requires fiscal transfers to compensate the losers, policies to encourage rental
supply, or to link GSE reform to the elimination of the mortgage interest deduction. This last
result is mainly due to the renters, who are the major losers of the mortgage interest deduction
and would vote in favor of GSE reform if it comes with the repeal of the deduction.
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1 Related Literature
This paper is related to the growing literature which uses models of heterogeneous agents
with idiosyncratic labor income risk to study housing and/or mortgage markets.5 Several
papers in this area, such as Chambers, Garriga, and Schlagenhauf (2009); Floetotto, Kirker,
and Stroebel (2016); Gervais (2002); Jeske, Krueger, and Mitman (2013); or Sommer and
Sullivan (2015) analyze distributional effects of housing policies. This paper contributes to
this literature in many aspects. For example, aspects, such as the modeling of the mortgage
guarantees as a credit risk subsidy; the modeling of the housing tenure choice with endogenous
mortgage spreads, house prices and rents; or the presence of FHA, GSEs, and nonconforming
mortgages.
Through the questions that we study, our paper contributes to the literature analyzing
housing finance reform and the role of the government in mortgage markets. Frame, Wall,
and White (2013), Glaeser and Gyourko (2008), and Levitin and Wachter (2013) survey the
U.S. housing finance policy. Passmore, Sparks, and Ingpen (2002) and McKenzie (2002) have
estimated the average implicit subsidy from the GSEs. Our calibrated model matches those
estimates and highlights that average subsidies hide substantial heterogeneity across households.
The largest subsidies are for the GSE mortgagors with high leverage. To our knowledge, the
empirical literature on housing finance has not studied this cross-sectional heterogeneity.
Our paper complements Jeske, Krueger, and Mitman (2013) by showing that a different
way to model the GSEs’ subsidies leads to different distributional implications. Jeske, Krueger,
and Mitman (2013) analyze mortgage guarantees in a model with heterogeneous agents and
idiosyncratic risk. They conclude that eliminating the guarantees is a progressive policy that
would hurt high-income, high-wealth households. As we discuss in Section 4, we obtain the
opposite distributional results because we model the GSEs as a credit-risk subsidy to the lenders,
while Jeske, Krueger, and Mitman (2013) model the GSEs as a funding subsidy. The different
modeling choice determines who are the borrowers who benefit the most from the subsidy.
In Jeske, Krueger, and Mitman (2013), the funding subsidy from the GSEs lowers the cost
of credit equally for all borrowers. Thus, the high-income households that borrow the most
receive the largest subsidy. In our model, it is not the amount of borrowing but the risk of
the borrower that determines who gets the largest subsidy. Low-income mortgagors receive the
5Some examples include Arslan, Guler, and Taskin (2015); Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2015); Chu (2014);
Corbae and Quintin (2015); Dı´az and Luengo-Prado (2010); Guler (2015); Hatchondo, Martinez, and Sa´nchez
(2014); Iacoviello and Pavan (2013); Li et al. (2016); Mitman (2016); Silos (2007); or Sommer, Sullivan, and
Verbrugge (2013). Gete and Reher (2016) solve for the closed-form solutions of a model with aggregate shocks
but deterministic heterogeneity.
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largest subsidy because they have the largest default risk in GSE-insured loans. This difference
is the key driver of our different distributional results. Moreover, this paper complements Jeske,
Krueger, and Mitman (2013) by providing another reason why mortgagors hold deposits: they
serve as collateral that lower mortgage spreads.
Kim and Wang (2016) study the removal of the FHA credit-risk guarantees in a model
with nonrecourse mortgages. They obtain similar distributional results to what we obtain in
this paper. A key difference is that their model assumes constant deposit rates, price-to-rent
ratios, and homeownership rates. These assumptions eliminate some channels that we show are
important for a distributional analysis.
Elenev, Landvoigt, and Van Nieuwerburgh (2016) study a general equilibrium model with
aggregate shocks, borrowers, depositors, bankers, and a government that, in addition to sub-
sidizing mortgage credit risk, provides a bailout guarantee to the banks. Their focus is the
interaction between the guarantees and bankers’ risk-taking, not the distributional aspects.
They find that removing the guarantees leads to a more stable financial system with borrowers
indifferent on whether to remove the guarantees, while savers are substantially better off. Thus,
virtually nobody opposes the removal of the guarantees. Our results are different in this regard
because in our setup, the spreads endogenously depend on income, and because we allow for
rental markets. Thus, we take account of the groups who would lose with the policy change:
renters and low to mid-income mortgagors whose higher spreads prevent them from enjoying
the lower house prices while rents increase.
Zhang (2015) uses a partial equilibrium, deterministic assignment model to assess the dis-
tributional impact of eliminating the GSEs. He does not model households’ default and studies
the guarantees as a subsidy to the interest rate. He finds that the guarantees mostly benefit
low-income households.
2 Model
There is a continuum of infinitely lived households, a continuum of competitive lenders and
a government. It is a closed economy model. The model is described recursively.
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2.1 Households
Preferences: Households derive utility from consumption of the numeraire good (c) and
from housing services that we call shelter (s). Housing services can be either owned or rented,
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct, st),
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor. The tenure status of a household is denoted by the
indicator function Ih (Ih = 1 for a homeowner, Ih = 0 for a renter).
Endowments: Households supply labor inelastically and receive an idiosyncratic stochastic
labor income y ∈ Y measured in terms of the numeraire. This shock follows a finite state Markov
chain with transition probabilities pi(y′|y) and unique invariant distribution Π(y).6 The income
mean is y¯ =
∑
y∈Y
yΠ(y). Because of the law of large numbers, pi and Π describe the fraction
of households receiving a particular income shock, and y¯ is the aggregate income. We use a
progressive tax system that allows for mortgage interest deductions. The function τ(y,m, Pm)
summarizes the total tax payments for a household with an income of y, mortgage loan m and
gross mortgage rate 1
Pm
. Thus, y− τ(y,m, Pm) is the disposable income. Moreover, households
receive a lump-sum transfer T (y) from the government which are a function of income.
Markets: There are five markets: owner-occupied housing, rental housing, consumption
goods, mortgage credit, and deposits. Households can invest in one-period deposits Pdd
′ which
pay d′ next period. Thus, the gross risk-free rate is 1
Pd
. Shelter services can be rented at rental
price Ps or obtained from owning a house. The price of a house is Ph. The aggregate stock
of housing (H) is in fixed supply. Rental supply is endogenous. One unit of housing stock h
equals one unit of shelter services s. A household can be a renter (h = 0), a homeowner who
consumes all her housing (h = s), or a landlord who rents part of her housing holdings (h > s).
To have well-defined renters and owners, there is a minimum house size for ownership, h ≥
¯
h,
but no minimum size for rental.7 Moreover, to match the relative sizes of owner-occupied and
rental housing, there is a minimum housing consumption for landlords,
¯
s <
¯
h.
To introduce uncertainty about the value of a house, there are idiosyncratic housing depre-
ciation shocks δ′ such that if a house of size h is bought today, then next period the size of
the house is (1− δ′)h. We denote the associated cumulative distribution function as F (δ′) with
support [
¯
δ, 1], where
¯
δ ≤ 0. Thus, houses are risky assets.
6A prime denotes the value at the start of the next period.
7With perfectly divisible housing, almost everybody would own some housing.
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If a household buys a house, she can use it as collateral for one-period mortgage debt. We
denote the principal of the loan by Pmm
′, and the amount to be repaid next period by m′.
The gross mortgage rate 1
Pm
is determined by perfect competition among lenders as we discuss
below. The mortgage spread is sm =
1
Pm
− 1
Pd
.
A borrower can default on her mortgage after the idiosyncratic shocks (y′, δ′) are realized at
the cost of losing her housing stock, a fraction φy < 1 of her disposable income, and a fraction
φd < 1 of her deposits.
8 Thus, a borrower will default whenever her wealth after repaying the
mortgage is smaller than the sum of unseizable disposable income and deposits:
y′ − τ(y′,m′, Pm) + d′ + Ph(1− δ′)h−m′ < (1− φy)(y′ − τ(y′, 0, 0)) + (1− φd)d′. (1)
The probability of default is a function of the mortgage m′, housing h, deposits d′, and current
labor income y, which affects the realization of y′ through pi(y′|y).
Households can choose between FHA, GSE, and private (jumbo) mortgage loans. The
indicator Ig takes the value of 1 if the household chooses a GSE mortgage, and 0 otherwise (we
denote If and Ij for FHA and jumbo mortgages). Like in the data, FHA and GSE loans are
subject to a common maximum loan size l¯, and to loan-to-value caps θg and θf , respectively.
2.2 Household problem
The household decides her consumption, savings in deposits, tenure choice (renter or owner),
and whether to take a FHA, GSE, or jumbo mortgage loan. We denote by a the wealth
after the realization of the income and housing depreciation shocks, that is, disposable in-
come plus the value from all assets brought into the period plus transfers. The value func-
tion V (a, y) is the value of the optimal tenure and mortgage choice. Households take prices
(Ph, Ps, Pd, P
g
m, P
f
m, P
j
m(m
′, h, d′, y)) as given. Next, we characterize the problems of a home-
buyer who faces GSE, FHA or jumbo mortgages, the problem of a renter, and the household’s
decision between rental, ownership and type of mortgage.
8Section 4 shows that whether or not mortgages are recourse is not important for the results.
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First, the household facing a GSE-insured mortgage solves:
Vg(a, y) = max
c,d′,m′≥0,s≥
¯
s,h≥
¯
h
{
u(c, s) + β
∑
y′∈Y
pi(y′|y)
∫ 1
¯
δ
V (a′, y′) dF (δ′)
}
subject to (2)
c+ Pdd
′ + Phh = a+ Ps (h− s) + P gmm′, (3)
s ≤ h, (4)
P gmm
′ ≤ min{θgPhh, l¯}, (5)
a′ = max
{
y′ − τ(y′,m′, P gm) + d′ + Ph(1− δ′)h−m′, (1− φy)(y′ − τ(y′, 0, 0)) + (1− φd)d′
}
+ T (y′).
(6)
The term Ps (s− h) in Equation (3) represents rental income received by landlords (when
h > s). Equation (4) captures that a homeowner cannot lease more rental space than her
housing space. The maximum loan-to-value and loan size on GSE loans are summarized in
(5). Equation (6) defines the beginning-of-next period wealth a′ following the optimal default
rule discussed in (1). The first argument in the max operator of Equation (6) is the disposable
income, plus the return on deposits, plus the value of the depreciated house, minus the mortgage
payments. The second argument in (6) is the income plus the deposits that the household keeps
if she defaults.
Second, the household facing a FHA-insured mortgage solves:
Vf (a, y) = max
c,d′,m′≥0,s≥
¯
s,h≥
¯
h
{
u(c, s) + β
∑
y′∈Y
pi(y′|y)
∫ 1
¯
δ
V (a′, y′) dF (δ′)
}
subject to (7)
c+ Pdd
′ + Phh = a+ Ps (h− s) + P fmm′, (8)
s ≤ h, (9)
P fmm
′ ≤ min{θfPhh, l¯}, (10)
a′ = max
{
y′ − τ(y′,m′, P fm) + d′ + Ph(1− δ′)h−m′, (1− φy)(y′ − τ(y′, 0, 0)) + (1− φd)d′
}
+ T (y′).
(11)
Equation (10) summarizes the maximum loan-to-value and loan size of FHA loans. The mort-
gage rate on FHA loans is higher than the one of GSE loans (that is, 1
P fm
> 1
P gm
) but the
minimum downpayment requirement of FHA loans is lower (that is, θf > θg).
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Third, the household borrowing a jumbo mortgage solves:
Vj(a, y) = max
c,d′,m′≥0,s≥
¯
s,h≥
¯
h
{
u(c, s) + β
∑
y′∈Y
pi(y′|y)
∫ 1
¯
δ
V (a′, y′) dF (δ′)
}
subject to (12)
c+ Pdd
′ + Phh = a+ Ps (h− s) + P jm(m′, h, d′, y)m′, (13)
s ≤ h, (14)
a′ = max
{
y′ − τ(y′,m′, P jm) + d′ + Ph(1− δ′)h−m′, (1− φy)(y′ − τ(y′, 0, 0)) + (1− φd)d′
}
+ T (y′).
(15)
The lending rate of jumbo loans depends on the mortgage m′, house size h, deposits d′, and
current income y. Jumbo loans are not subject to any exogenous limit.
Fourth, households who are renters solve:
Vr(a, y) = max
c,s,d′≥0
{
u(c, s) + β
∑
y′∈Y
pi(y′|y)V (a′, y′)
}
subject to (16)
c+ Pss+ Pdd
′ = a, (17)
a′ = y′ − τ(y′, 0, 0) + d′ + T (y′). (18)
Renters cannot borrow from mortgage markets.
Fifth, and finally, the household’s value function V (a, y) is the maximum of the previous
four options:
V (a, y) = max
Ig ,If ,Ij ,Ir∈{0,1}
{
IgVg(a, y) + IfVf (a, y) + IjVj(a, y) + IrVr(a, y)
}
subject to (19)
Ig + If + Ij + Ir = 1. (20)
The homeownership tenure indicator is Ih = 1− Ir.9
9To simplify the notation, we denote the overall optimal choice variables as
c(a, y) = Ig(a, y)cg(a, y) + If (a, y)cf (a, y) + Ij(a, y)cj(a, y) + Ir(a, y)cr(a, y),
where the subscripts g, f , j, and r refer to GSE, FHA, jumbo homeowners, and renters. We use similar notation
for s, d′, m′, h and Pm. We denote the individual state variables as x = (a, y), and X = A × Y is the state
space. We denote the probability measure over X with µ. Since we focus on stationary equilibria in which µ is
constant across time, we omit the dependence of prices on µ.
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2.3 Lenders
Lenders are risk neutral and compete loan by loan. Lenders are financed through deposits at
cost 1
Pd
; they also face origination costs rw per unit of mortgage issued.
10 Lenders will originate
any mortgage that in expectation allows them to cover their cost of funds. Lenders take into
account that households may default on their mortgages. If the borrower defaults then the
lender receives a fraction γ < 1 of the house value, a share φy of borrower’s labor income, and
a share φd of her deposits. The loss for the lender in case of borrower’s default is the difference
between the mortgage payments m′ and the amount the lender really recovers:
L(m′, h, d′, y′, δ′) = m′ − φy(y′ − τ(y′, 0, 0))− φdd′ − γPh(1− δ′)h. (21)
In GSE and FHA loans, the government completely assumes the lender’s loss. In contrast,
in jumbo loans the lender absorbs all the loss. Lenders pay a guarantee fee (g-fee) to receive
the FHA and GSE insurance. The FHA g-fee is larger than the GSEs’ g-fee, gf > gg. This
condition implies that FHA mortgages have larger lending rates than GSE mortgages. FHA
also allows for lower down payments as discussed before.
A borrower owing mortgage repayments m′, with house size h, deposits d′, and realized labor
income y′ will default whenever she suffers depreciation shocks δ′ larger than the depreciation
threshold function δ∗(m′, h, d′, y′) implicit in equation (1) ,11
δ∗(m′, h, d′, y′) = 1 +
φyy
′ + (1− φy)τ(y′, 0, 0)− τ(y′,m′, Pm) + φdd′ −m′
Phh
. (22)
Lenders price mortgages insured by the GSEs according to the lender’s zero-profit condition:
(1 + rw + g
g)P gmm
′
Pd
= m′, (23)
where P gmm
′ is the principal of the loan. The left side of (23) is the cost of funds for the lender
because the lender has to cover the origination cost, the GSE g-fee (gg) , and the cost of the
deposits that fund the loan. The right side of (23) is the revenue from the mortgage loan.
10Positive origination costs (rw > 0) ensure a positive mortgage spread over the deposit rate for households
with zero-default risk. This prevents indeterminacy in their maximization problems.
11From here onward, we omit the dependency of the depreciation threshold function δ∗ on m′, h, d′, and y′
whenever necessary to save on notation.
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Lenders price mortgages insured by the FHA according to the lender’s zero-profit condition:
(1 + rw + g
f )P fmm
′
Pd
= m′, (24)
where P fmm
′ is the principal of the loan.
Jumbo mortgages are priced according to the lender’s expected zero-profit condition:
(1 + rw)P
j
m(m
′, h, d′, y)m′
Pd
=
∑
y′∈Y
pi(y′|y)
{
m′F (δ∗) +
∫ 1
δ∗
[{
φy(y
′ − τ(y′, 0, 0)) + φdd′
+ γPh(1− δ′)h
}]
dF (δ′)
}
.
(25)
Jumbo lenders are not subject to a g-fee because they do not enjoy any guarantee on their
potential losses. Thus, the right side of (25) prices the potential default of the borrower (default
happens for shocks δ′ above δ∗(m′, h, d′, y′)) and the recovery values.
2.4 Government
The government collects the g-fees and raises taxes to finance transfers, government spend-
ing, and the credit risk guarantees. This is consistent with how the Congressional Budget Office
(CBO) computes the government’s budget. The CBO inputs the cost of the credit risk subsidies
as a spending of the federal government (CBO 2014).
We denote by Ψg the credit losses absorbed by the government from GSE loans:
Ψg =
∫
X
∑
y′∈Y
pi(y′|y)
∫ 1
δ∗
Ig(x)L(m
′(x), h(x), d′(x), y′, δ′) dF (δ′) dµ, (26)
and by Ψf the credit losses from FHA loans.
The tax receipts Ω are
Ω =
∫
X
∑
y′∈Y
pi(y′|y)
[∫ δ∗
¯
δ
τ(y′,m′(x), Pm(x)) dF (δ′) +
∫ 1
δ∗
τ(y′, 0, 0) dF (δ′)
]
dµ, (27)
where households’ total tax liability is a function τ(y′,m′, Pm) of households’ income and mort-
gage payments because mortgage interests are tax deductible up to a maximum deductible ζ.
We use a tax function calibrated to match the U.S. tax system:
τ(y′,m′, Pm) = κy′ + ι(y′,m′, Pm). (28)
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The government budget constraint equals the revenue of the government (tax receipts plus
mortgage guarantee-fee income) to the government’s expenditures: mortgage losses plus lump-
sum transfers and exogenous government spending:
Ω + gg
∫
X
Ig(x)P
g
mm
′(x) dµ+ gf
∫
X
If (x)P
f
mm
′(x) dµ = Ψg + Ψf +
∑
y∈Y
Π(y)T (y) +G. (29)
2.5 Market clearing and equilibrium
Since one unit of housing provides one unit of shelter services, the market for shelter services
clears when the demand for shelter equals the aggregate housing stock H, which is in fixed
supply: ∫
X
s(x) dµ = H. (30)
Moreover, every house needs to have an owner:∫
X
h(x) dµ = H. (31)
Equations (30) and (31), together with the homeownership indicator Ih, allow us to write the
equilibrium in rental markets as∫
X
(1− Ih(x))s(x) dµ = H −
∫
X
Ih(x)s(x) dµ. (32)
The left side of (32) is the demand for rental housing services. The right side of (32) is the
supply of rental housing, that is, the total flow of housing services minus those consumed by
homeowners.
The credit market clears if the supply of deposits equals the funds requested by the banks
to lend:∫
X
Pdd
′(x) dµ = (1 + rw + gg)
∫
X
Ig(x)P
g
mm
′(x) dµ+ (1 + rw + gf )
∫
X
If (x)P
f
mm
′(x) dµ
+ (1 + rw)
∫
X
Ij(x)P
j
m(m
′(x), h(x), d′(x), y)m′(x) dµ. (33)
The goods market clears when the aggregate endowment of consumption goods (y¯) equals the
consumption by households, plus the gross investment in housing (ih) that ensures a constant
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housing stock, plus the costs of mortgage origination and other government spending:∫
X
c(x) dµ+ ih + rw
∫
X
Ig(x)P
g
mm
′(x) dµ+ rw
∫
X
If (x)P
f
mm
′(x) dµ
+ rw
∫
X
Ij(x)P
j
m(m
′(x), h(x), d′(x), y)m′(x) dµ+G = y¯. (34)
The investment (ih) to cover both the housing net depreciation and the foreclosure costs is
ih = Ph
∫
X
∑
y′∈Y
pi(y′|y)
[∫ δ∗
¯
δ
δ′ dF (δ′) +
∫ 1
δ∗
(1− γ(1− δ′)) dF (δ′)
]
h(x) dµ, (35)
where ih is multiplied by house prices to convert it into units of numeraire.
We define a stationary equilibrium as follows:
Definition A stationary recursive competitive equilibrium is a set of value and policy functions
for FHA, GSE, jumbo mortgagors, and renters: Vf (x), Vg(x), Vj(x), Vr(x), cf (x), sf (x), d
′
f (x),
hf (x), m
′
f (x), cg(x), sg(x), d
′
g(x), hg(x), m
′
g(x), cj(x), sj(x), d
′
j(x), hj(x), m
′
j(x), cr(x), sr(x),
d′r(x), household tenure and mortgage choices If (x), Ig(x), Ij(x), Ir(x), house price Ph, shelter
price Ps, deposit interest rate
1
Pd
, mortgage prices for FHA and GSE loans P fm, P
g
m, jumbo
mortgage price function P jm(m
′, h, d′, y), a tax function τ(y,m, Pm), lump-sum transfers T (y),
and a probability measure µ over X such that:
1. Given prices, tax function, and transfers, the value and policy functions solve the house-
hold problems (2), (7), (12), (16) , and (19).
2. Given prices and tax function, the FHA, GSE, and jumbo mortgage pricing satisfy (23)-
(25) for any household’s choice.
3. The government budget constraint (29) is satisfied.
4. The market-clearing conditions (30)-(34) are satisfied.
5. The measure µ is stationary with respect to the Markov process induced by pi(y′|y), F (δ′)
and the policy functions.
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3 Calibration
We divide the parameters into two groups. First, those that we assign exogenously following
micro-evidence and standard values in the literature. Second, those parameters endogenously
selected to match some targets. Table 1 summarizes the parameters. A period in the model
corresponds to a year. The Online Appendix contains all the details of this section.
3.1 Exogenous parameters
We assume a CRRA utility function over a CES aggregator for nonhousing consumption
and shelter:
u(c, s) =
[
ηc
−1
 + (1− η)s −1
] (1−σ)
−1
1− σ . (36)
Several papers have argued that the elasticity of intratemporal substitution  is below one.
We set  = 0.5, a value within the accepted range.12
To calibrate the earnings process, we follow the literature and assume
ln y′ = w¯ + ρ ln y + ε, (37)
ε ∼ N(0, σ2ε).
We set the standard deviation of the innovations σε to 0.129 like Storesletten, Telmer, and
Yaron (2004), and the persistence parameter ρ to match a Gini index for earnings of 0.43, like
the 2004 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) for prime age households with positive wage
income. We approximate equation (37) with a seven-state Markov chain using the method of
Rouwenhorst (1995).
Regarding the maximum loan-to-value for FHA and GSE mortgages, we assume the usual
3.5% and 20% minimum down payments, θg = 0.8 and θf = 0.965. We set the GSE g-fee (gg)
to 20 basis points, which according to Elenev, Landvoigt, and Van Nieuwerburgh (2016) was
the average rate from 2000 to 2012. In Section 6 we explore the implications of increasing
the GSE g-fee to 60 basis points. Following Pennington-Cross (2006), we set the residual
value of a foreclosed house (γ) to 0.78. We set φy = 0.25 because Title III of the Federal Wage
Garnishment Law, Consumer Credit Protection Act stipulates that in case of default the amount
12Davidoff and Yoshida (2008) obtain estimates ranging from 0.4 to 0.9. Kahn (2008) provides evidence based
on both aggregate and microeconomic data that is less than one. Li et al. (2016) reports an elasticity of 0.487.
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to be garnished by the creditor may not exceed 25% of the disposable wage earnings. According
to Table 20 of the FHFA Monthly Interest Rate Survey, the average mortgage origination cost
during 2002-2006 was 0.43%. Thus, we set the cost of mortgage origination (rw) at 40 basis
points.
We design the tax function τ(y′,m′, Pm) to match the U.S. tax system as we discuss in the
Online Appendix. We construct the transfer function T (y) to match the government transfers
reported by the CBO (2016), which include cash payments and in-kind benefits from social
insurance and government assistance programs.
3.2 Endogenous parameters
Following Jeske, Krueger, and Mitman (2013), we assume a generalized Pareto distribution
for the housing depreciation shock δ′.13 The distribution is truncated to the interval [
¯
δ, 1], where
¯
δ ≤ 0. The cumulative density function is
F (δ′) =
1−
(
1 + ξ
(δ′−
¯
δ)
σδ
)− 1
ξ
1−
(
1 + ξ
(1−
¯
δ)
σδ
)− 1
ξ
. (38)
The location (
¯
δ), scale (σδ), and shape (ξ) parameters, together with the remaining 8 pa-
rameters of the model, are calibrated to match the following 11 targets:14 (1) An equilibrium
risk-free rate of 1%. (2) An aggregate share of shelter services over total consumption expen-
ditures of 14.1%. This is the average value over the last 40 years from NIPA data reported by
Jeske, Krueger, and Mitman (2013). (3) A homeownership rate of 66%, which was the U.S.
average during the period 1970-2014. (4) A share of homeowners with mortgage debt of 70.7%,
which matches the value reported by Varasini (2013) for 2012. (5) A share of GSE loans of
65% of the total volume. (6) 56.1% of mortgagors with DTV ≥ 60%, which comes from the
2004 SCF. (7) A median deposit-to-asset ratio ( d
′
Phh+d′
) for mortgagors of 8.48%, like in the
SCF 2004.15 (8) A median size of owner-occupied-to-rental housing of 1.85. According to the
2013 American Housing Survey, the median size of owner-occupied housing is 1,800 sqft, while
the median size of renter-occupied housing is 974 sqft. (9) A foreclosure rate for mortgagors
13A thick right-tail distribution is needed to match the empirical foreclosure rates. Moreover, the Pareto
distribution allows for a closed-form expression for the jumbo pricing function as shown in the Online Appendix.
14The housing stock (H) and government spending (G) are the residuals of the housing market-clearing
condition (31) and government budget constraint (29).
15We proxy deposits by liquid assets, measured in the SCF as financial wealth minus the sum of quasi-liquid
retirement, life insurance, certificates of deposit, and savings bonds.
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of 1.2%, which is consistent with U.S. mortgage foreclosures between pre-2006 and post-2015.
(10) An average house depreciation rate of 1.48%, which matches the 1960-2002 average re-
ported by Jeske, Krueger, and Mitman (2013). (11) A standard deviation of the cross-sectional
housing depreciation shocks of 8%. This value is consistent with the range of 6%–10% standard
deviation of annual house price growth across U.S. states reported by the FHFA since 1991.
Table 2 compares the empirical targets with the model-generated moments. The model fits
the data well. Moreover, concerning other moments not directly targeted, we obtain reasonable
values. For example, (1) the share of jumbo loans is 25.1% of the total volume. According to
the Urban Institute, nearly 25% of the mortgages originated in 2014 were jumbo loans. (2)
An average implicit interest rate subsidy of 44.7 basis points.16 According to CBO (2010), the
spread between interest rates on jumbo and conforming loans suggests that the GSEs lowered
mortgage interest rates from less than 25 basis points in normal times to more than 100 basis
points at the end of September 2010. (3) A median deposit-to-asset ratio across households
of 25.7%. The corresponding value in the 2004 SCF is 21.1%. (4) In the model, government
spending is the sum of credit losses, transfers and government outlays. We compute GDP as the
sum of aggregate endowment of nonhousing goods plus the value of the shelter services. The
model generates a ratio of government expenditures to GDP of 22.1%. In the data, this ratio
is, on average, 22.7% for the period of 2006-2016.17 (5) The shares of mortgagors with debt
payments-to-income (DTI) exceeding 31% and 43% are 10.4% and 8.4%, respectively. This is
consistent with the guidelines for conventional mortgages. (6) The calibrated model implies a
cost differential between FHA and GSE loans of 1.86%. This value is very close to the data once
we sum the interest rate differential and the FHA mortgage insurance premiums.18 (7) The
distribution of rental supply along the wealth distribution (Table A1 in the Online Appendix)
is consistent with the data reported by Chambers, Garriga, and Schlagenhauf (2009). Using
the 1996 Property Owners and Managers Survey, they document that although the majority
of rental housing is supplied by middle or wealthy households, 25% of the supply is owned by
low-income households. This compares with 30% for the high-income households.
Finally, to comment on the parameter that controls the garnishment of deposits (φd), this
parameter plays two roles. On one side, it controls the insurance that deposits provide in case
of default. On the other side, it affects mortgage spreads since it controls the probability of
16The GSE interest rate subsidy (Θ) is the difference between the jumbo rate of a GSE borrower and the
GSE rate. Formally, Θ(m′, h, d′, y) = 1
P jm(m′,h,d′,y)
− 1
P gm
. The average implicit GSE interest rate subsidy is the
average of Θ computed over the group of GSE mortgagors.
17NIPA series for current expenditures of the Federal Government-to-GDP.
18According to USBank.com, the average long-term rates of 30-year fixed FHA and conventional mortgages
are 4.0% and 4.125%, respectively. In addition, FHA requires an upfront premium of 1.75% plus an annual
premium of around 0.8% of the loan amount.
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default and the assets seized upon default. If φd = 0, only the insurance role operates. If φd = 1
only the collateral role operates. We obtain φd = 47.2% which suggests a balance between both
roles. This parameter is key to match the median deposit-to-asset ratio for mortgagors.
4 Credit Supply
In this section, we analyze the reaction of the lenders, in partial equilibrium, to removing
the GSEs. This exercise helps to understand the drivers of the new distributional results that
we will present in the following section.
There are two ways to model the GSEs. One way is to model them as a ”funding subsidy.”
That is, the GSEs are able to finance themselves at cheaper rates because they enjoy the
support of the U.S. government. They pass their lower cost of funds on to the lenders, who
then pass this subsidy to the mortgagors through lower rates. Jeske, Krueger, and Mitman
(2013) model the GSEs as a ”funding subsidy.” The second way to model the GSEs is as a
”credit risk subsidy.” That is, the g-fees that the GSEs charge do not capture all the credit
risk that the GSEs are absorbing. Thus, the GSEs provide a subsidy to credit risk. Elenev,
Landvoigt, and Van Nieuwerburgh (2016) model the GSEs as a ”credit risk subsidy.” Lucas
(2011) and CBO (2014) provide strong evidence that GSEs are under-pricing credit risk. In
fact, in 2008 the credit risk turned into losses and the U.S. government had to place the GSEs
under conservatorship.
Figure 1 plots mortgage credit supply for three cases.19 First, the case with no subsidy of
any type. Credit supply is the spread between the jumbo loans price function P jm(m
′, h, d′, y)
from Equation (25) and the risk-free rate. As any credit supply curve, it is increasing in default
risk proxied by the debt-to-house-value m
′
Phh
(DTV). Second, Figure 1 plots mortgage credit
supply when there is only a ”funding subsidy” like in Jeske, Krueger, and Mitman (2013).
That is, the GSEs lower lenders’ cost of funds and competitive lenders pass along the subsidy
as lower mortgage rates. It is important to remark from Figure 1 that a funding subsidy implies
the same reduction in spreads regardless of the risk of the mortgage. That is, funding subsidies
do not change the dispersion of the cross-sectional distribution of mortgage spreads. Removing
the funding subsidy will increase mortgage spreads almost equally across households, regardless
of their default risk. Thus, a funding subsidy is basically a ”level effect.”
19All curves assume that the borrower has the minimum house size, median income, and deposits of the
benchmark calibration.
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Figure 1 also plots mortgage supply with a ”credit risk subsidy” as we do in this paper.20
The credit risk subsidy is a ”shape effect” relative to the jumbo credit supply. That is, the GSEs
absorb credit risk from the lenders and thus lenders charge the same spread regardless of the
default risk. Interestingly, the difference between the spread of a GSE-guaranteed mortgage
and a jumbo mortgage is increasing in DTV. Thus, the GSEs reduce the dispersion in the
cross-sectional distribution of mortgage spreads because they reduce the spreads more for the
high-risk households. That is, the GSEs provide a larger subsidy to riskier loans. This is
consistent with the evidence in Lucas (2011) and CBO (2014).
Figure 1 illustrates the mechanism that drives the distributional results of the next section.
Since we model the GSEs as a credit risk subsidy, their removal will increase mortgage spreads
the most for the households with highest default risk (that both in the data and in the model
are the low and mid-income mortgagors).21 These are the households who receive the largest
subsidy from the GSEs and oppose their removal the most.
Figure 2 shows that whether mortgages are recourse is not an essential element for the dis-
tributional implications of the GSEs. Figure 2 compares the spreads between jumbo mortgages
with partial recourse, like in our calibration, and mortgages with no recourse (i.e., φy = φd = 0).
Recourse is similar to a ”level shifter,” like the funding subsidy. The reason is that both with
and without recourse, the spread depends on the DTV, and DTVs are decreasing in wealth.
Thus, modeling the mortgage contract with or without recourse does not significantly change
the cross-sectional distribution of the spreads, and thus it does not significantly affect who wins
and loses from removing the GSEs. Confirming this insight, Kim and Wang (2016) analyze
the removal of the FHA guarantees in a nonrecourse model with credit risk subsidies and find
similar distributional results to what we present in the next section.
5 Implications of Removing the GSEs
In this section we study the removal of the GSEs. First, we characterize households’ portfolio
and borrowing choices. This helps to understand why households borrow and buy houses in the
model. Then, we study the aggregate and the cross-sectional effects across households. Finally,
we simulate an election in which households vote on whether or not to eliminate the GSEs.
Section 7 studies the robustness of these results to different modeling choices.
20To focus on the role of the subsidy, Figure 1 plots the case when the g-fee gg is zero.
21With strategic default, the model would imply that households’ default risk decreases even more with wealth
because the punishment for default is usually larger for wealthier households.
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5.1 Households
In this model, buying a house instead of renting is potentially appealing because of the fol-
lowing reasons: (1) It is an asset with collateral properties. This can be seen because housing
holdings are nonmonotonic in wealth for low-wealth homeowners.22 To smooth consumption,
these households buy extra housing to borrow against it. As their wealth increases and their
consumption smoothing needs are smaller, these households decrease their housing and mort-
gage holdings. (2) Because markets are incomplete, a house is an asset that helps households
to save and smooth consumption. However, because of depreciation shocks, it is a risky asset.
On the other hand, it generates rental income with positive excess return over the deposit
rate. This explains that when households become wealthy enough, they increase their housing
holdings to be landlords. (3) Mortgage interest payments are tax deductible. Figure A1 in
the Online Appendix plots the households’ choices of housing (h), deposits (d′), and mortgage
borrowings (m′) as a function of wealth (a) for households with the median income (y4). The
figure illustrates the drivers of the homeownership decision.
It is useful to classify households into four groups. As income and wealth increase, house-
holds move from one group to the next one:
(1) Renters: households who neither own a house nor have a mortgage (h = m′ = 0) but
usually have some deposits (d′ ≥ 0). Most households with low incomes are renters. Their
income and wealth are so low that they cannot get enough credit to buy the minimum house.
(2) High leveraged homeowners: these are homeowners with mortgage credit (h ≥
¯
h,m′ > 0)
and high debt-to-income and debt-to-assets. Low-income homeowners borrow through FHA
mortgages because the FHA requires lower down payments, although FHA spreads are larger
than GSE spreads. As soon as the household can afford a 20% down payment, she switches
to a GSE-insured mortgage. Because deposits can be partially kept in case of default, they
provide valuable insurance to homeowners. Even high-leverage households have deposits. This
insurance mechanism is characterized in Jeske, Krueger, and Mitman (2013). Moreover, our
model has a new argument to hold deposits: since lenders can partially seize them in case of
default, larger deposit holdings serve as collateral and lower jumbo mortgage spreads.
(3) Low-leveraged homeowners: high-income households usually borrow through jumbo
mortgages to avoid the GSEs limits on mortgage size. Their default risk is low because their
DTV and DTI are small. Mortgage debt is appealing because its interest payments are tax-
deductible.
22For details, see Figure A1 in the Online Appendix.
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(4) Homeowners without debt: these are households with large housing and deposit holdings
that do not require mortgage debt. These households are landlords who rent some of their
housing holdings.
5.2 Aggregate effects of removing the GSEs
Table 3 summarizes the aggregate effects of removing the GSE-insured mortgages. Removing
the GSEs implies that the government does not have to cover the credit losses Ψg in the
government budget constraint (29) . Table 3 considers two ways in which the government can
rebate the unspent credit losses Ψg to households: (1) through lower taxes (without altering
the progressive nature of the tax system) and (2) through higher transfers (without altering
the progressive nature of the transfer system).23
Eliminating the GSEs increases the cost of mortgage credit for households previously bor-
rowing through GSE-insured mortgages (both FHA and jumbo loans have higher rates for
those households). Average mortgage spreads increase. The contraction in the demand for
credit leads to lower deposit rates to discourage households from supplying deposits.24 Some
households either buy less housing or decide not to buy and instead rent. Housing prices de-
crease while housing rents increase. Housing price-to-rent ratios decrease. Lower return on
deposits, cheaper housing prices, and higher housing rents encourage the high-wealth house-
holds to rebalance their portfolios from deposits toward housing. Homeownership rates decrease
and housing holdings become more concentrated.
5.3 Distributional effects of removing the GSEs
To analyze who wins and who loses from eliminating the GSEs, it is useful to start with
the correlation between default risk and the credit subsidy. In our model, DTV and DTI are
decreasing in wealth while holdings of deposits are increasing, like in the Survey of Consumer
Finances. Thus, GSE borrowers with lower wealth have higher default risk and enjoy higher
credit risk subsidies. High-wealth households do not receive much subsidy because either their
default risk is small, or they do not use GSE loans. FHA borrowers may suffer from the GSE
23Specifically, when the government budget is balanced via an increase in transfers, we adjust ς, where
T (y) = (ς + α(y))y. In the benchmark economy, ς = 0. The Online Appendix contains the details on the
construction of the coefficients of transfers as a share of labor income α(y).
24Our model abstracts from the corporate, government, and foreign sectors that also play a role in credit
markets. Adding these sectors may cushion the drop in deposit rates since those sectors would increase their
credit demands as rates fall. In Section 7, we explore the case in which the deposit rate remains constant.
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removal because they may be planning to switch to a GSE mortgage once they can afford the
20% down payment. Thus, the benefits from the GSEs are asymmetrically distributed across
households. For instance, the average subsidy is 45 basis points but its standard deviation is 32
basis points. To further illustrate this point, Figure A2 in the Online Appendix plots the GSE
credit subsidy as a function of wealth (a) for the households with median income level (y4).
To formally evaluate the welfare changes after the policy change, we compute the Consump-
tion Equivalent Variation (CEV), ω(a, y), as the change in per-period composite consumption
such that a household is indifferent when moving from a stationary economy with GSEs to
another without GSEs.25 Let u˜(c˜) = u(c, s) be the utility of a household in terms of composite
consumption.26 Formally, for each state (a, y) we solve for ω(a, y) such that
E0
[ ∞∑
t=0
βtu˜
(
(1 + ω(a, y))c˜t
) ∣∣∣ (a, y)] = E0 [ ∞∑
t=0
βtu˜(c˜Nt )
∣∣∣ (a, y)] , (39)
where the superscript N refers to the economy with no GSEs. If ω(a, y) > 0 the household
has higher utility when the GSEs are removed, that is, she must be compensated to live in the
economy with GSEs.
Figure 3 plots the CEV as a function of wealth for different levels of income. Table A2
reports the average CEV for different groups of households. There is significant heterogeneity
on the welfare assessment across the wealth and income distributions. Renters, high-leverage
homeowners, and households with very large deposit holdings lose with the removal of the
GSEs. Low-leverage and wealthy households win.
To illustrate the channels that drive the previous results, Figure 4 plots, along the wealth
dimension, a decomposition of the CEV for the very low-income households (y1) and for the
25Given that, in our model, physical capital is nonexistent and the supply of housing is fixed, the transition
toward the new steady state happens in a few periods. Thus, the welfare gains of the transition path should be
very similar to the steady state welfare gains.
26That is, c˜ =
[
ηc
−1
 + (1− η)s −1 ] −1 .
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median income households (y4) into five channels:
27
ω(a, y) ≈ ωGSE(a, y)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Credit risk subsidy channel
+ ωPh(a, y)︸ ︷︷ ︸
House price channel
+ ωPs(a, y)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Rental price channel
+ ωPd(a, y)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Interest rate channel
+ ωκ(a, y)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Tax channel
.
(40)
First, there is the credit risk subsidy that we discussed in Section 4 and showed in Figure
A2. Removing the GSEs implies that the riskier households with GSE guarantees lose their
credit-risk subsidies. The bottom panel of Figure 4 shows that this effect is very strong for mid-
income and low- and mid-wealth households. Their mortgage spreads increase the most once
the GSEs are removed. This channel is basically nonexistent for low-income renters because
they had a low probability of becoming GSE mortgagors in the future. It has some relevance for
those renters and FHA borrowers who perhaps would have switched to GSE-insured mortgages
in the future if the GSEs were not eliminated. As a household gets wealthier and becomes
a low-leverage mortgagor or a homeowner with no debt, the probability that the household
becomes a GSE mortgagor in the future decreases. Thus, it also decreases the value of the GSE
credit risk subsidy.
Second, there is a house price channel. Removing the GSEs lowers demand to buy houses
by the households whose cost of mortgage credit is larger. House prices fall, as Table 3 shows.
This is beneficial for those households whose mortgage spreads are not affected (FHA borrowers
and wealthier households). Renters have a small house price channel because, although cheaper
prices help them to buy a house, their utility from owning a house decreases when lower house
prices reduce the collateral value of a house (the ability to borrow against it).
Third, there is a rent channel because removing the GSEs leads to higher rents as some
households cannot get credit, or find it too expensive and prefer to become renters. This rent
channel is negative for the low-income households that are renters. It is beneficial for the
wealthy households that are landlords.
Fourth, the fall in deposit rates hurts the deposit holders, which are the richest households
who hold most of the deposits, and also for those renters in the margin of homeownership with
relatively large savings in deposits.28 As deposit savings lose value, the wealthy households can
27The Online Appendix contains the exact decomposition. ωGSE(a, y) is the CEV between the benchmark
equilibrium and the partial equilibrium response of the households when the GSEs are removed but the house
price, rental price, interest rate, and taxes remain constant at the benchmark equilibrium values. Similarly,
ωPh(a, y) is the CEV between the former partial equilibrium and the partial equilibrium response of the house-
holds when the house price Ph changes to the value in the no GSE equilibrium (P
N
h ) but the other prices and
taxes are kept at the benchmark equilibrium values. The other components are computed in a similar way.
Different orderings of the decomposition yield similar results.
28In Section 7, we explore the case with constant risk-free rates (small-open economy model) and find that
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shift their portfolios toward housing (the return from being a landlord is higher), whereas the
low- and mid-income households cannot do so because access and cost of mortgage credit act as
an entry barrier. Lower deposit rates imply lower mortgage rates for those mortgagors whose
spreads are not affected by the credit-risk channel discussed above.
Fifth, the government, once it saves in credit risk subsidies, can lower taxes. Every household
benefits from paying lower taxes.
The addition of the five channels make the welfare consequences for mid-income households
(y ∈ {y4, y5}) highly nonmonotone in wealth as Figure 3 plots. The largest welfare losses are
in the mid-income, low and mid-wealth households who borrow from the GSEs with 20% down
payments. The winners from the reform are some FHA borrowers that benefit from the housing
price channel, the wealthier households also benefit, especially those with jumbo mortgages or
no debt, that can expand their housing holdings, pay less in taxes, and enjoy the higher housing
rents as landlords.29
5.4 Voting for the removal of the GSEs
Following the previous discussion, Table 4 simulates a referendum among the households
on whether or not to eliminate the GSEs. Reforming the housing finance system has been in
the policy agenda for several years but all proposals so far have failed. Table 4 suggests an
explanation. The majority of households (around 60%) opposes eliminating the GSEs.
Table 4 also reports the percentage of households in favor of removing the GSEs with house-
holds classified by housing tenure, leverage, and wealth. The table illustrates the disagreement
between households: the majority of renters are against the removal; some FHA homeowners
support the removal; GSE high-leverage mortgagors are opposed; low-leverage, jumbo mort-
gagors, and homeowners with no debt are in favor of eliminating the GSEs.
Interestingly, our results seem consistent with the political economy of the GSE reform in the
United States. For example, political groups associated with low and mid-income households,
such as The Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights and the National Council of La
Raza, have been among the major defenders of the GSEs together with Democratic Senators
(The Hill 2015, Open Letter to the FHFA from the Leadership Conference 2014).
the welfare assessment of the wealthiest households is reversed.
29To better assess the importance of the rent and interest rate channels, Table A3 in the Online Appendix
reports the CEV excluding those two channels from the sum in (40). Once these two channels are removed,
basically only the high leveraged mortgagors with conforming loans oppose the removal of the GSEs.
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6 Policy Analysis
In this section, first, we study the benefits and drawbacks of the GSEs. Second, we show that
fiscal policy, or raising the g-fees, are alternatives to the GSEs’ removal. Third, we study the
interactions between removing the GSEs and eliminating the mortgage interest rates deduction.
Interestingly, we find that it is easier to reform the GSEs if the reform is done simultaneously
with the elimination of the interest rates deduction.
6.1 Benefits and drawbacks of the GSEs
Table 5 summarizes the benefits and drawbacks of the GSEs. In terms of drawbacks, the
GSEs lead to a larger amount of foreclosures because they provide a subsidy to credit risk.
Foreclosures lower welfare in the model because they lead to deadweight losses. Moreover,
Elenev, Landvoigt, and Van Nieuwerburgh (2016), in a model with aggregate shocks, show that
the GSEs lead to financial fragility.
Figure A3 has an extra result on financial fragility that complements Elenev, Landvoigt,
and Van Nieuwerburgh (2016). Eliminating the GSEs will reduce the aggregate debt-to-output
ratio of the economy (on average, DTV and DTI are lower). But it will change the cross-
sectional composition of leverage. Low- and mid-income households (who are now enjoying
the GSE subsidies) would reduce their leverage, while high-income households would increase
their leverage. This result happens because for low- and mid-income households the increase in
spreads dominates the reduction in deposit rates and housing prices. However, for high-income
households, the reduction in deposit rates and housing prices dominate and these households
increase leverage when the GSEs are removed.
Concerning the benefits from the GSEs, Table 5 reports an ex ante utilitarian CEV com-
puted by a planner who equally weights every agent in the stationary distribution.30 Removing
the GSEs decreases ex ante utilitarian CEV. To understand this result, Table 5 decomposes the
ex ante CEV into a level effect (aggregate size of the economy) and a distributional effect.31
Removing the GSEs leads to positive level effects because there are less deadweight costs asso-
ciated with foreclosures and less mortgage origination costs. In terms of magnitudes, the level
terms are similar to those of Elenev, Landvoigt, and Van Nieuwerburgh (2016).32 Moreover, the
30The ex ante utilitarian CEV is the CEV of a household under the veil of ignorance about her income and
wealth. The Online Appendix has the definition.
31See the Online Appendix for details.
32Foreclosure costs are 0.38% of GDP in the benchmark economy with GSEs and fall by 55.1%, origination
costs are 0.76% of GDP and fall by 54.0%.
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housing maintenance costs drop because maintenance expenses are proportional to the value of
the house. However, the distributional terms induce a negative ex ante CEV because remov-
ing the GSEs generates higher inequality in consumption and the utilitarian CEV has concave
preferences.
Regarding wealth inequality, without the GSEs, the distribution of wealth becomes more
concentrated, as reflected by an increase in the Gini index and in the ratios of the wealth
percentiles reported in Table 5. Wealth inequality increases mainly for two reasons: (1) low-
wealth renters have to spend more in housing rents and save less (the number of renters increase
without the GSEs), and (2) homeowners who lose the credit-risk subsidy cut their savings.
Figure A4 in the Online Appendix plots the stationary distribution of wealth with and without
GSEs.
6.2 Alternative policies: Fiscal policy or G-fee increases
In this subsection we analyze two policies that would mitigate the inequality implications
of removing the GSEs. First, Figure A5 in the Online Appendix shows that the government
could use a system of taxes and transfers conditional on households’ income to implement the
redistribution now generated by the GSEs. That is, Figure A5 reports the changes in the
current system of transfers that imply that the average of each income group is indifferent once
the GSEs are removed (zero CEV). The mid-income groups that lose the most should receive
the largest increase in transfers. The wealthier households should see their transfer reduced,
except for the households with the largest holdings of deposits who see large losses in their
savings. The results in Figure A5 suggest that fiscal policy could implement the redistribution
now done through the GSEs, without inducing higher mortgage debt and foreclosures that the
GSEs do.
Table 5 studies the case in which the GSEs are maintained and their the g-fees are increased
from 20 basis points to 60 basis points. That is, lenders need to pay higher fees to receive the
GSEs’ credit risk insurance. Table 5 highlights that raising the g-fees is an intermediate stage
between keeping the GSEs and eliminating them. Higher g-fees lead to less credit and less
foreclosures, although wealth inequality increases.
The increase in wealth inequality from raising the g-fees is consistent with the results of
Elenev, Landvoigt, and Van Nieuwerburgh (2016), but different in terms of their conclusion that
there is an overall welfare gain. This is because our model has more borrower heterogeneity
while Elenev, Landvoigt, and Van Nieuwerburgh (2016) has macro-financial stability, which our
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model does not.
6.3 GSEs and mortgage interest deductibility
In this subsection we study the interactions between the reforms of the GSEs and of the
mortgage interest rate deductibility. The policy debate treats the two reforms as independent
but here we show that the cross-sectional distribution of the winners and losers suggests they
should be related.
Table 6 shows that repealing the interest rate deductibility leads to lower mortgage credit,
housing prices and homeownership.33 Most of these results are already in Sommer and Sullivan
(2016), but the results for homeownership are different. This difference is driven by the behavior
of mortgage spreads, that are exogenous in Sommer and Sullivan (2016). Table 6 reflects that
when mortgage spreads are endogenous like in this paper, the interest mortgage deductibility
is priced in the jumbo spreads. Lenders understand that deducting interest rates from tax
payments help mortgagors to repay their debt. Thus, mortgage spreads increase with the
removal of the interest rate deduction as default risk increases. And the higher mortgage
spreads reduce homeownership.
Table 7 simulates a referendum among the households on whether to eliminate the GSEs
and/or the mortgage interest rate deductibility. Most households favor the removal of the
mortgage interest rate deduction (Sommer and Sullivan 2016 obtain the same result). However,
the middle-class (third quintile in the wealth distribution) is firmly supporting the interest rate
deduction. The poorest households are strongly against it.
Table 7 suggests interesting interactions between the reforms. The mid-wealth households
are strongly in favor of keeping both the GSEs and the tax deduction in place. However, it is
easier to approve a removal of the GSEs if it comes with the removal of the mortgage interests
deduction. This result is mainly due to the renters, who oppose the removal of the GSEs because
rents would increase, but who favor the removal of the interest rate deductibility because they
do not enjoy it.
33The government budget is balanced through adjustment in taxes. As Section 5 shows, balancing the budget
with transfers or taxes does not alter the results.
27
7 Robustness
Given the importance of the housing rents and interest rate channels discussed in Section
5.3, in this section we explore two alternative modeling choices. First, we modify the model
to allow landlords to diversify housing risk. This is key to generate a more elastic supply of
rental housing that tames both the housing rents and interest rate channels. The consequences
are important because it makes the GSE reform much more likely to be approved. Second, we
focus on the case when deposit rates are not sensitive to the removal of the GSEs.
7.1 Real estate fund
In the benchmark model of Section 2, landlords are exposed to housing value risk that
cannot be diversified. This is consistent with the mom-and-pop investors popular in rental
markets and discussed by Chambers, Garriga, and Schlagenhauf (2009). However, there are
also corporate landlords with the size and tools to diversify housing value risk. Raymond et al.
(2016) discuss how new technologies facilitate the rise of the large corporate landlord even in
the single-family rental market.
In this subsection we allow landlords to diversify housing value risk. To model corporate
landlords, we assume that there is a real estate fund with a perfectly diversified portfolio of
housing assets that it rents every period. That is, the depreciation for the houses owned by the
fund is deterministic. Households can be mom-and-pop landlords like in the model of Section
2, but they can also invest in this real estate fund. There is a fixed per-period participation
cost of investing in the real estate fund. This investment provides a safe return in excess of the
deposit rate.34 Thus, in equilibrium, wealthy households invest in the real estate fund.
Table A4 contains the aggregate effects in the model with a real estate fund and, for ease of
exposition, also in the benchmark model of Section 2 with rebates via taxes. Comparing across
columns we see the consequences of diversifying housing risk: following the GSE removal, the
fall in house prices and the increase in housing rents are smaller because corporate landlords
are more willing to invest than mom-and-pop investors. Thus, corporate landlords generate
an elastic supply of rental housing which mitigates the rent channel, as Table A6 confirms.
The welfare losses for renters are smaller, and in fact now a slight majority of them favors the
removal of the GSEs.
Also interesting, allowing a richer investment set improves the welfare of the wealthy house-
34The Online Appendix has the formal details.
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holds who now do not need to suffer the wealth loss associated with the lower deposit rate. In
fact, since these households now can diversify better, Table A4 shows a much smaller fall in
deposit rates. Table A6 confirms that now the vast majority of the wealthy households favors
the removal of the GSEs.
Thus, the real estate fund has tamed both the rent and the deposit rate channels. As a
consequence, Table A6 shows that now the removal of the GSEs can obtain the majority of the
votes. However, the rise of the corporate landlord is associated with a much larger fall in the
homeownership rate. Moreover, since deposit rates fall by a smaller amount, high leveraged,
middle-class households suffer more from higher mortgage costs. On the positive side, since less
low income households are exposed to housing risk, foreclosures fall by much more in the case
with the real estate fund.
7.2 Constant deposit rates
Our model abstracts from the corporate, government, and foreign sectors that also play a
role in credit markets. These sectors would increase their credit demands as interest rates fall
when the GSEs are removed. Thus, these sectors would cushion the drop in deposit rates. In
this subsection we redo the baseline exercise of Section 5 but assume constant deposit rates.
Table A5 contains the aggregate results. It is interesting to remark that with constant
deposit rates the wealthier households have less incentives to reallocate their portfolios away
from deposits. Thus, house prices need to fall more to encourage those households to buy the
houses not bought by the households that are now renters. The larger fall in house prices
mitigates the increase in mortgage spreads for some households and homeownership falls by
much less. Rents increase more as rental supply expands less.
Table A6 has the cross-sectional implications. Renters are worse-off than in the baseline
case with flexible deposit rates since the higher rents dominate that their savings do not suffer a
fall in returns. Mid-wealth, highly indebted households are also worse off since constant deposit
rates amplify the increase in mortgage spreads. However, the wealthiest households are much
better when the deposit rate does not fall. Thus, removing the GSEs becomes much more
regressive when interest rates are constant. For this reason, the results of a vote show that
most households oppose the removal, like in the benchmark case.
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8 Conclusions
In this paper, we have analyzed the distributional and aggregate consequences of removing
the GSEs. The model has endogenous mortgage spreads and all the relevant aspects of current
U.S. housing policy (taxes, social transfers, FHA, GSE, jumbo loans, and mortgage interest
deductibility). Our main result is that if the GSEs are modeled as a credit-risk subsidy, and if
household’s default risk is decreasing in wealth, then the GSEs benefit the low and mid-income
households. That is, the GSEs are progressive, not regressive, institutions.
We have shown that the uneven distribution of welfare gains and losses after removing the
GSEs may explain why reforming the housing finance system is such a complicated endeavor.
Most households (especially low- and mid-wealth households) oppose the elimination of the
GSEs. GSE reform may require a system of transfers to compensate the losers, or to ensure
that rental housing supply is elastic enough to mitigate increases in rents, or to link the reform
to jointly eliminating the interest rate deduction. In this case, renters are more likely to support
both reforms together.
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Figure 1: Credit supply for different ways of modeling the government guarantee
subsidy
This figure plots the mortgage spread
(
1
Pm(m′,h,d′,y) − 1Pd
)
as a function of the borrower’s debt-
to-house value
(
m′
Phh
)
for a household with an income level of y4 (median income). In one
curve government guarantees are nonexistent (i.e., the jumbo market); in another curve the
guarantees are modeled as a subsidy to lenders’ cost of funds (i.e. a funding subsidy); and
in the third curve the guarantees are modeled as a subsidy to lenders’ credit risk (in case of
borrower’s default the government covers lender’s losses). All curves assume that the borrower
has the minimum house size, median income, and deposits of the benchmark calibration.
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Figure 2: Credit supply under recourse and nonrecourse mortgages if no credit
risk guarantees exist
This figure plots the mortgage spread
(
1
Pm(m′,h,d′,y) − 1Pd
)
as a function of the borrower’s debt-
to-house value
(
m′
Phh
)
for a household with an income level of y4 (median income). One curve is
for the case of recourse mortgages and the other curve is for the case of nonrecourse mortgages.
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Figure 3: Welfare gains or losses from removing the GSEs
Each panel plots, for a different income level and as a function of wealth, the percentage change
in composite consumption (consumption equivalent variation, CEV) that makes a household
in the economy with GSEs indifferent between that economy and an economy with no GSEs.
The value is positive if the household has higher utility when the GSEs are removed.
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Figure 4: Decomposing welfare gains
This figure plots households’ consumption equivalent variation (CEV) for each of the different
channels that drive the welfare changes reported in Figure 3. The top panel shows households
with an income of y1 (bottom 2%), whereas the bottom panel plots an income of y4 (median
income). Section 5.3 discusses the details of the decomposition.
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Table 1: Parameters, benchmark calibration
Exogenous parameters
Parameter Value Description
 0.5 Intratemporal elasticity of substitution
ρ 0.986 Labor income persistence
σε 0.129 Labor income volatility
θg 0.8 Down payment requirement GSEs
θf 0.965 Down payment requirement FHA
gg 20 basis points Guarantee fee GSEs
γ 0.78 Foreclosure recovery rate
φy 0.25 Labor income garnishment
rw 40 basis points Mortgage origination cost
τ(y,m, Pm) See the Online Appendix Progressive tax function
T (y) See the Online Appendix Transfer function
Endogenous parameters
η 0.523 Nonhousing share in consumption
σ 3.97 CRRA parameter
β 0.948 Discount factor
¯
h 4.98 Minimum house size
l¯ 5.54 Limit conforming mortgage
gf 204 basis points Guarantee fee FHA
¯
s 3.51 Minimum shelter consumption (owners)
φd 0.472 Recourse on deposits
ξ 0.684 Pareto shape parameter
σδ 0.0179 Pareto scale parameter
¯
δ -0.0273 Pareto location parameter
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Table 2: Model moments and targets
Moment Target Model
Risk-free rate (%) 1 1
Housing services in total consumption (%) 14.1 14.1
Homeownership rate (%) 66 68.5
% of homeowners with mortgage debt 70.7 72.7
GSE loans as % of total volume 65 66.3
% of mortgagors with debt-to-value ≥ 60% 56.1 61.8
Median deposit-to-asset ratio for mortgagors (%) 8.44 9.6
Median size of owner-occupied-to-rental housing 1.85 1.98
Foreclosure rate (%) 1.2 1.14
Average house depreciation (%) 1.48 1.46
House price volatility (%) 8 8.36
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Table 3: Aggregate effects of removing the GSEs
Variable With GSEs Change to no GSEs
If taxes adjust If transfers adjust
Risk-free rate 1% -34.2bp -33.6bp
Average implicit mortgage subsidy 44.7bp -44.7bp -44.7bp
Homeownership rate 68.5% -2.22% -2.23%
Average debt-to-value mortgagors 58.1% -19.3% -19.7%
Average mortgage spread 0.717% 22.1bp 20.1bp
% of homeowners with debt 72.7 -6.87% -6.02%
Housing stock-to-GDP ratio 4.21 -1.55% -1.63%
Median deposit-to-asset ratio 25.7% -13.3% -13.4%
House price 1 -1.16% -1.21%
Shelter price 0.0299 3.18% 3.38%
Price-to-rent ratio 33.4 -4.20% -4.44%
This table compares the benchmark economy with GSEs to the economy with no GSEs (in
one case the government savings in subsidies is rebated to households through lower taxes and
in the other case through higher transfers). BP, basis points. GDP = y¯ + PsS, where S is
aggregate shelter.
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Table 4: Percentage of households that agree with removing the GSEs
Wealth quintile group
1 2 3 4 5 All
Renter 53.3 0.24 0.01 0 — 33.8
High leveraged homeowner — 0.15 17.7 — — 11.6
Low leveraged homeowner — — 40.0 93.5 100 78.3
No debt homeowner — — — 85.3 52.7 63.2
All 53.3 0.20 22.2 89.5 54.5 43.9
This table reports the percentage of households of a certain type that agree with removing
the GSEs, that is, the percentage with CEV> 0. Low-leverage homeowners are those with
debt-to-value below the median debt-to-value in the benchmark economy with GSEs. Wealth
quintile group refers to the households in the quintile.
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Table 5: Effects of removing the GSEs or increasing the GSEs G-fees
Variable With GSEs Change to Change to
no GSEs GSEs g-fee 60bp
(if taxes adjust) (if taxes adjust)
Foreclosure rate (%) 1.14 -38.3bp -8.72bp
Mortgage stock-to-GDP ratio 1.92 -54.0% -33.9%
Wealth distribution
Gini index 0.540 2.90% 1.14%
p75/p25 ratio 6.02 20.9% 10.7%
p80/p20 ratio 9.33 15.6% 7.73%
p90/p10 ratio 20.9 4.56% 3.95%
p90/p50 ratio 3.62 9.18% 3.34%
Decomposing welfare gains (CEV in %)
Aggregate level effect (1) — 0.636 0.329
Distributional effect (2) — -1.149 -0.558
Total (1) + (2) — -0.513 -0.229
This table compares the benchmark economy with GSEs g-fee of 20 bp to the economy without
them and with the economy with GSEs g-fee of 60 bp. The consumption equivalent variation
(CEV) measures the aggregate welfare gains from the removal of the GSEs or increasing the
GSEs g-fees using a utilitarian criteria to aggregate. BP, basis points.
43
Table 6: Aggregate effects of removing the GSEs and/or the mortgage interest deduction
Variable Change relative to benchmark with GSEs
If no deduction If no GSEs
& no deduction
Risk-free rate -14.5bp -49.3bp
Average implicit mortgage subsidy -6.75bp -44.7bp
Homeownership rate -0.65% -2.66%
Average debt-to-value mortgagors -4.46% -20.4%
Average mortgage spread 2.14bp 18.1bp
% of homeowners with debt -13.7% -10.1%
Housing stock-to-GDP ratio -0.60% -1.97%
Median deposit-to-asset ratio -3.73% -18.8%
House price -0.38% -1.60%
Shelter price 1.74% 3.01%
Price-to-rent ratio -2.08% -4.47%
This table compares the benchmark economy with GSEs to two counterfactuals: (1) the econ-
omy with no mortgage interest deduction and (2) the economy with no guarantees and no
mortgage interest deduction. BP, basis points.
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Table 7: Percentage of households that agree with removing the GSEs and/or the mortgage
interest deduction
Wealth quintile group No GSEs No interest No GSEs & no
deduction interest deduction
Quintile 1 53.3 98.3 96.4
Quintile 2 0.20 57.7 0.20
Quintile 3 22.2 5.55 19.3
Quintile 4 89.5 91.2 90.4
Quintile 5 54.5 63.4 49.7
All 43.9 62.7 51.2
This table reports the percentage of households that agree with removing the GSEs, the mort-
gage interest deduction, or both policies. Wealth quintile group refers to the households in the
quintile.
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A Online Appendix
A.1 Consumption-Shelter Decision
We simplify the household’s maximization problem by first solving analytically the static
problem of how to allocate resources between consumption (c) and shelter (s). Given a house-
hold’s state (a, y), housing tenure and mortgage choice (Ig, If , Ij, Ir), and a feasible portfolio
choice (d′,m′, h), we denote as g the resources available for current consumption, that is
g = a− (Ph − Ps)h+ IgP gmm′ + IfP fmm′ + IjP jm(m′, h, d′, y)m′ − Pdd′.
The problem of allocating g resources between consumption c and shelter s is
U(g, h, Ih) = max
c,s≥0
[
ηc
−1
 + (1− η)s −1
] (1−σ)
−1
1− σ ,
subject to
c+ Pss = g,
¯
s ≤ s ≤ h if Ih = 1.
The closed-form solution to the maximization problem is c(g, h, Ih) = g − Pss(g, h, Ih) and
s(g, h, Ih) =

¯
s if
¯
s > (1− θ) g
Ps
and Ih = 1,
h if h < (1− θ) g
Ps
and Ih = 1,
(1− θ) g
Ps
else.
The associated indirect utility is
U(g, h, Ih) =

[
η(g − Ps
¯
s)
−1
 + (1− η)(
¯
s)
−1

] (1−σ)
−1
1− σ if ¯s > (1− θ)
g
Ps
and Ih = 1,[
η(g − Psh) −1 + (1− η)(h) −1
] (1−σ)
−1
1− σ if h < (1− θ)
g
Ps
and Ih = 1,[
η + (1− η)P 1−s
] 1−σ
−1 g1−σ
1− σ else,
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where θ is the optimal share allocated to consumption absent the constraints on shelter:
θ =
η
η + (1− η)P 1−s
.
A.2 Labor Income Process
We discretize the AR(1) labor income process using the method of Rouwenhorst (1995). We
choose w¯ such that the stationary mean labor income is normalized to one. The set of income
shock realizations is
Y = {0.1133, 0.2125, 0.3984, 0.7470, 1.4007, 2.6266, 4.9251},
with transition probability matrix:
pi =

0.9584 0.0408 0.0007 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0068 0.9587 0.0340 0.0005 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0136 0.9588 0.0272 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0001 0.0204 0.9589 0.0204 0.0001 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 0.0272 0.9588 0.0136 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0005 0.0340 0.9587 0.0068
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0007 0.0408 0.9584

,
which implies the stationary distribution Π = (0.0156, 0.0937, 0.2344, 0.3125, 0.2344, 0.0938,
0.0156).
A.3 Transfers
We calibrate the transfers conditional on labor income using Table 7 of the Supplemental
Data in The Distribution of Household Income and Federal Taxes 2013 reported by CBO (2016).
The transfers include cash payments and in-kind benefits from social insurance and government
assistance programs. We set T (y) = α(y)y. Then we compute labor income for each group and
estimate α(y) from the data on transfers as a share of labor income. We ensure that the units
are consistent with our model. For the labor income values in A.2 we obtain:
{α(yi)}7i=1 = {0.7115, 0.6925, 0.5659, 0.3081, 0.1224, 0.0604, 0.0392}.
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A.4 Tax Function
The flat component of the tax function (28) is set to the payroll tax in 2013, κ = 7.65%.
To construct the ι(y′,m′, Pm) term of (28), we follow the tax schedule described in the 2013
IRS Form 1040 Instructions, Schedule Y-2, page 101. We convert all cutoff levels in the units
appropriate to our model using the median CPS wage earnings in 2013. Table A7 shows the
normalized marginal tax rates, cutoff income levels, and maximum deductible mortgage amount.
We define ι(y′,m′, Pm) = ϕ(z(y′,m′, Pm)), where ϕ(z) is a fifth order polynomial,
ϕ(z) =

∑5
i=0 aiz
i if z ≤ 5.58,∑5
i=0 ai5.58
i + 0.396(z − 5.58) else.
Where z denotes taxable income, it is labor earnings minus mortgage interest deductions, that
is, z(y′,m′, Pm) = max {y′ − (1− Pm) min {m′, ζ} , 0}. Taxable income cannot be negative. For
computational tractability, we follow Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2015) and assume that the
interest deduction for a jumbo mortgagor is based on the risk-free mortgage rate ( 1
P rfm
= 1+rw
Pd
).
To solve for the coefficients {ai}5i=0 we minimize
∑
z∈Z (ϕ(z)− ϕ˜(z))2 subject to ϕ(0) = 0
and ϕ′(5.58) = 0.396. Z is an equally spaced grid of 1000 points over the interval [0, 5.58], and
ϕ˜(z) is the tax function consistent with Table A7,
ϕ˜(z) =
tn(z − z1) if n∗(z) = 1,∑n∗(z)
i=2 ti−1(zi − zi−1) + tn∗(z)(z − zn∗(z)) if n∗(z) > 1,
where n∗(z) is the maximum n ∈ {1, 2, ..., 7} such that z ≥ tn. The solution is {ai}5i=0 =
{0, 0.1013, 0.0533, 0.0016,−0.0022, 0.0002}. Figure A6 compares the marginal tax rates in the
data and those implicit in the model tax function ϕ(z).
A.5 Mortgage Pricing Function
Here we derive a closed-form expression for the jumbo mortgage pricing function (25). The
expression is useful since allows to avoid numerical integration over the depreciation shock δ′.
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Integrating by parts on the last term of the right side of (25) gives
∫ 1
δ∗
(1− δ′) dF (δ′) =

∫ 1
¯
δ
F (δ′) dδ′ if δ∗ <
¯
δ,
−(1− δ∗)F (δ∗) + ∫ 1
δ∗ F (δ
′) dδ′ if
¯
δ ≤ δ∗ ≤ 1,
0 else.
If the depreciation shocks follow (38), using integration by substitution we obtain the fol-
lowing expression for the integral of the cumulative distribution function
∫ 1
δ∗
F (δ′) dδ′ =
1− δ∗ + σδ
1−ξ
[(
1 + ξ
(1−
¯
δ)
σδ
)1− 1
ξ −
(
1 + ξ
(δ∗−
¯
δ)
σδ
)1− 1
ξ
]
1−
(
1 + ξ
(1−
¯
δ)
σδ
)− 1
ξ
.
Using these equations in (25) gives a closed-form expression for the mortgage pricing function.
A.6 Household Problem
We solve the household problem using discrete state space methods. The algorithm is:
Step 1. Initialize the value function V (0) at each grid point of the state space.
Step 2. At each grid point of the state space, the ith iteration maximization problem searches
for the housing tenure and mortgage type choice that solves
V (i)(a, y) = max
Ig ,If ,Ij ,Ir∈{0,1}
{
IgV
(i)
g (a, y) + IfV
(i)
f (a, y) + IjV
(i)
j (a, y) + IrV
(i)
r (a, y)
}
subject to
Ig + If + Ij + Ir = 1.
The value function of a homeowner facing a GSE insured mortgage is
V (i)g (a, y) = max
h≥
¯
h,d′≥0,m′≥0
{
U(g, h, 1) + β
∑
y′∈Y
pi(y′|y)
∫ 1
¯
δ
V (i−1)(a′, y′) dF (δ′)
}
subject to
g = a− (Ph − Ps)h+ P gmm′ − Pdd′,
P gmm
′ ≤ min{θgPhh, l¯},
a′ = max
{
y′ − τ(y′,m′, P gm) + d′ + Ph(1− δ′)h−m′, (1− φy)(y′ − τ(y′, 0, 0)) + (1− φd)d′
}
+ T (y′).
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The value function of a homeowner facing a FHA insured mortgage is
V
(i)
f (a, y) = max
h≥
¯
h,d′≥0,m′≥0
{
U(g, h, 1) + β
∑
y′∈Y
pi(y′|y)
∫ 1
¯
δ
V (i−1)(a′, y′) dF (δ′)
}
subject to
g = a− (Ph − Ps)h+ P fmm′ − Pdd′,
P fmm
′ ≤ min{θfPhh, l¯},
a′ = max
{
y′ − τ(y′,m′, P fm) + d′ + Ph(1− δ′)h−m′, (1− φy)(y′ − τ(y′, 0, 0)) + (1− φd)d′
}
+ T (y′).
The value function of a homeowner facing a jumbo mortgage is
V
(i)
j (a, y) = max
h≥
¯
h,d′≥0,m′≥0
{
U(g, h, 1) + β
∑
y′∈Y
pi(y′|y)
∫ 1
¯
δ
V (i−1)(a′, y′) dF (δ′)
}
subject to
g = a− (Ph − Ps)h+ P jm(m′, h, d′, y)m′ − Pdd′,
a′ = max
{
y′ − τ(y′,m′, P rfm ) + d′ + Ph(1− δ′)h−m′, (1− φy)(y′ − τ(y′, 0, 0)) + (1− φd)d′
}
+ T (y′).
The value function of a renter is
V (i)r (a, y) = max
d′≥0
{
U(a− Pdd′, 0, 0) + β
∑
y′∈Y
pi(y′|y)V (i−1)(y′ − τ(y′, 0, 0) + d′ + T (y′), y′)
}
.
If the constraint set is empty in any problem conditional on being homeowner (GSE, FHA,
jumbo), then the corresponding value function takes value minus infinity.
For (a′, y′) outside the state space grid, we evaluate the value function V (i−1)(a′, y′) using
piecewise linear interpolation. We break the conditional expectation in two parts∫ 1
¯
δ
V (i−1)(a′, y′) dF (δ′) =
∫ δ∗
¯
δ
V (i−1)(a′, y′) dF (δ′)
+ (1− F (δ∗))V (i−1)([(1− φy)(y′ − τ(y′, 0, 0)) + (1− φd)d′ + T (y′)] , y′),
where we use a Gauss-Legendre integration method to calculate the integral over the payment
interval [
¯
δ, δ∗].
Step 3. Update the value function V (i).
Step 4. Repeat Steps 2 and 3 until the value of the value function at each state space grid
point converges, i.e. ‖V (i) − V (i−1)‖ ≤ ε.
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Some additional comments:
Step 1: To discretize the state space, we have seven income points (y) , and for each one we
create a grid A(y) = {a(y)i}ni=1 of n = 64 points for the wealth level a. We set the minimum
element of each grid a1(y) equal to (1− φy)(y − τ(y, 0, 0)) + T (y), which is the starting wealth
next period in case of default in the current period if d′ = 0. We construct polynomial spaced
grids with more density at the lower bound by using a linearly spaced grid z over [0, 1] and
then constructing the grid for a(y) as a1(y) + (an(y)− a1(y))z1/α. We set α = 0.4.
Step 2: To ensure that we find a global solution, we perform the maximization in two steps.
First, we solve the household’s problem using grid search. We use an evenly spaced grid of
75 points for h, 75 points for m′, and 75 points for d′. Second, we use the solution obtained
through grid search to start an optimization algorithm and solve the maximization problem at
each grid point. For the computation of the integral in the conditional expectation, we use 16
Gauss-Legendre quadrature nodes.
Step 3: We set ε = 10−5.
A.7 Stationary Distribution
We look for a stationary distribution of the state variables. We approximate the stationary
measure µ(a, y) with a discrete density function. Define δ∗(a, y, y′) and a′(a, y, y′, δ′) as the
shock default threshold (22) and next-period wealth implied by the optimal decision rules for
(a, y) and the next-period shocks (y′, δ′). The algorithm to compute a stationary distribution
is:
Step 1. Discretize the state space. Denote the income specific grid by A(y) = {ai(y)}ni=1 where
a1(y) = (1 − φy)(y − τ(y, 0, 0)) + T (y). We define a grid Q = {δ, ..., 1} for the depreciation
shock δ′ and let p(δ′) be a probability mass function defined over Q.
Step 2. Initialize the measure µ(0) at each grid point of the state space.
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Step 3. During the ith iteration, update µ(i)(aj(y
′), y′) and µ(i)(aj+1(y′), y′) as follows:
µ(i)(aj(y
′), y′) =
∑
y∈Y
∑
a∈A(y)
∑
δ′∈Q∗
pi(y′|y)F (δ∗(a, y, y′)) p∗(δ′)
[
aj+1(y
′)− a′(a, y, y′, δ′)
aj+1(y′)− aj(y′)
]
× I (aj(y′) ≤ a′(a, y, y′, δ′) ≤ aj+1(y′))µ(i−1)(a, y)
+
∑
y∈Y
∑
a∈A(y)
pi(y′|y) [1− F (δ∗(a, y, y′))]
[
aj+1(y
′)− a′(a, y, y′, δ∗(a, y, y′))
aj+1(y′)− aj(y′)
]
× I (aj(y′) ≤ a′(a, y, y′, δ∗(a, y, y′)) ≤ aj+1(y′))µ(i−1)(a, y),
where I(x) equals 1 if the statement x is true, 0 otherwise, and Q∗(a, y, y′) is the set of δ′ ∈ Q
such that δ′ ≤ δ∗(a, y, y′) with conditional probability mass function p∗(δ′) defined over Q∗.
µ(i)(aj+1(y
′), y′) is updated using the same equation as above after replacing the first and
third terms in square brackets by
[
a′(a,y,y′,δ′)−aj(y′)
aj+1(y′)−aj(y′)
]
and
[
a′(a,y,y′,δ∗(a,y,y′))−aj(y′)
aj+1(y′)−aj(y′)
]
.
The previous equation says that if next-period wealth falls in one particular wealth interval,
then allocate the distribution to the adjacent two grid points of wealth according to (1) the
distance to the two adjacent grid points; (2) the transition of y′ and δ′; and (3) the share of
population that defaults. In practice, we iterate over current states (a, y) and allocate the mass
to future states.
The conditional probability mass function is p∗(δ′i) =
p(δ′i)∑
δ′∈Q∗ p(δ′)
.
Step 4. Repeat Step 3 until the value of the measure at each state space grid point converges,
that is, ‖µ(i) − µ(i−1)‖ ≤ ε.
Some additional comments:
Step 1: We discretize the distribution of the shock variable δ′ by placing a grid of 1000 evenly
spaced points over [
¯
δ, 1] with associated probabilities p(δ′i) =
f(δ′i)∑
δ′∈Q f(δ′)
, where f(δ′) is the
probability density function of δ′.
Step 2: The measure µ(0) is initialized with a uniform distribution over the state space.
Step 3: We set ε = 10−12.
A.8 Equilibrium
With the optimal decision rules and the stationary distribution, we check if the equilibrium
conditions (29), (30), (31), and (33) hold within tolerance. If they do not, we update the initial
52
guesses for Ph, Ps, Pd and κ (if taxes adjust). Then we solve again the household problem in
A.6, the stationary distribution in A.7 and check if the conditions hold.
A.9 CEV and Ex Ante Utilitarian CEV
Given the preferences (36), the CEV, ω(a, y), that solves equation (39) has an analytical
solution in terms of the value functions:
ω(a, y) =
[
V N(a, y)
V (a, y)
] 1
1−σ
− 1.
As discussed in Section 5, the CEV ω(a, y) can be decomposed into five channels: (1) credit
risk subsidy (GSE removal), (2) house price, (3) rental price, (4) interest rate, and (5) tax. Let
V NGSE(a, y) be the value function of the partial equilibrium response of the households when the
GSEs are removed but the house price Ph, rental price Ps, interest rate
1
Pd
, and taxes κ remain
constant at the benchmark equilibrium values. Similarly, let V NPh(a, y) be the value function of
the partial equilibrium response of the households when the GSEs are removed, the house price
Ph changes to the value in the no GSE equilibrium (P
N
h ), but the other prices and taxes are
kept at the benchmark equilibrium values. The other value functions are defined in a similar
way. By construction, we have
V N(a, y)
V (a, y)
=
V NGSE(a, y)
V (a, y)
V NPh(a, y)
V NGSE(a, y)
V NPs (a, y)
V NPh(a, y)
V NPd (a, y)
V NPs (a, y)
V N(a, y)
V NPd (a, y)
.
Or, using the definitions in footnote 27,
(1 + ω(a, y)) = (1 + ωGSE(a, y)) (1 + ωPh(a, y)) (1 + ωPs(a, y)) (1 + ωPd(a, y)) (1 + ωκ(a, y)) .
Therefore, (40) follows. In practice, different orderings of the decomposition yield similar
results.
The ex ante utilitarian CEV (ω) is the CEV of a household under the veil of ignorance
about her income and wealth (recall that u˜(c˜) = u(c, s) where c˜ is composite consumption):
∫
Y×A
E0
[ ∞∑
t=0
βtu˜
(
(1 + ω)c˜t
) ∣∣∣ (a, y)] dµ = ∫
Y×A
E0
[ ∞∑
t=0
βtu˜(c˜Nt )
∣∣∣ (a, y)] dµN .
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Given the preferences (36) this ex ante CEV becomes:
ω =
[∫
Y×A V
N(a, y) dµN∫
Y×A V (a, y) dµ
] 1
1−σ
− 1.
Let gN be the gross growth rate of average composite consumption between the economy
with no GSEs and the benchmark with GSEs. The ex ante CEV can be decomposed into terms
capturing: (1) the aggregate level effect of composite consumption change (ωL),∫
Y×A
E0
[ ∞∑
t=0
βtu˜
(
(1 + ωL)c˜t
) ∣∣∣ (a, y)] dµ = ∫
Y×A
E0
[ ∞∑
t=0
βtu˜
(
gN c˜t
) ∣∣∣ (a, y)] dµ,
and (2) a term capturing the distributional effect across types and states (ωD),∫
Y×A
E0
[ ∞∑
t=0
βtu˜
(
gN(1 + ωD)c˜t
) ∣∣∣ (a, y)] dµ = ∫
Y×A
E0
[ ∞∑
t=0
βtu˜(c˜Nt )
∣∣∣ (a, y)] dµN .
By construction, (1 + ω) = (1 + ωL)(1 + ωD). By taking approximation, ω ≈ ωL + ωD.
A.10 Robustness Analysis
A.10.1 Real estate fund
A household invests Pvv
′ in the fund and tomorrow gets v′. With the investment, the real
estate fund buys houses and rents them out immediately, that is
∫
X
Pvv
′(x) dµ = PhK − PsK,
where K is the housing position of the fund. Tomorrow it sells the nondepreciated part and
pays back to investors to earn zero-profits, that is,
∫
X
v′(x) dµ = Ph(1− E(δ′))K.
The risk-free gross return of the fund’s investment strategy is then
1
Pv
=
Ph(1− E(δ′))
Ph − Ps ,
which pins down the price for the fund holdings Pv. There is a fixed per-period participation
cost for investing in the real estate fund (f). Hence, the fund has to earn a higher return than
the risk-free deposits in order to induce positive holdings in equilibrium (that is, 1
Pv
> 1
Pd
).
We assume that upon default the fund holdings are seized at the same rate as deposits
(φd). Then, the maximization problem of a GSE borrower in this new scenario is obtained by
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replacing d′ = d˜′ + v′, where d˜′ denotes deposits now, and by replacing the budget constraint
(3) with
c+ Pdd˜
′ + Pvv′ + I(v′ > 0)f + Phh = a+ Ps(h− s) + P gmm′.
The same applies for the maximization problem of FHA, jumbo mortgagor, and renter.
The housing market-clearing condition is now given by∫
X
h(x) dµ+K = H.
All the remaining equilibrium conditions remain the same except that in the left side of the
credit market-clearing condition (33) d′ is replaced by d˜′.
Regarding calibration, we set the discount factor β = 0.949 and the fixed participation cost
f = 0.074 to match an equilibrium risk-free rate of 1% and a ratio of aggregate real estate fund
investment-to-financial wealth of 30%.35 We retain the remaining parameters at the values
obtained in the calibration of the benchmark economy (hence the idiosyncratic house shocks
follow the same process as before). The model yields a share of GSE loans of 64.4%, similar to
the benchmark economy. Table A4 reports the relevant moments.
A.10.2 Constant deposit rate
The equilibrium with GSEs of this model is exactly like that in the benchmark economy with
GSEs. It differs with respect to the benchmark experiment in that the credit-market-clearing
condition (33) is not enforced and the risk-free rate 1
Pd
is kept constant.
A.11 Computing DTI
We proxy for mortgage payments in our one-period mortgage debt model as the difference
between the existing mortgage amount (m) and the new loan size (Pmm
′). We abstract from
mortgage refinancing transaction costs and therefore we can think of our model as one in which
households can freely adjust how fast they amortize their mortgage over time. Consequently, we
define mortgage debt payment-to-income (DTI) as (m−Pmm
′)
y
. We recover the existing mortgage
amount m (that is, the amount at the beginning of the period) associated to the current state
(a, y) using the equilibrium policy rules and iterating forward.
35This is the ratio of investment in real estate (which is not a part of the primary residence and that is not
owned by a business) to financial wealth in the SCF 2004 according to Guiso and Sodini (2013).
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Online Appendix. Figures and Tables.
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Figure A1: Households’ portfolio choice
This figure plots households’ choice of housing, deposits, and mortgage debt as a function of
wealth (a) for the households with median income level (y4).
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Figure A2: Default probability and implicit subsidy for GSE borrowers
The top panel plots the default probability for the household with median income (y4) who is
a GSE borrower. The bottom panel plots the implicit credit risk subsidy computed relative to
the nonconforming mortgage.
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Figure A3: Households’ debt-to-value with and without GSEs
Both panels plot debt-to-value before and after removal of the GSEs. The top panel focuses on
GSE-insured mortgagors. The bottom panel studies jumbo mortgagors.
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Figure A4: Wealth distribution with and without GSEs
This figure plots the stationary wealth distribution with and without GSEs.
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Figure A5: Transfer changes needed to undo redistribution induced by the removal
of the GSEs
This figure plots the changes in transfers needed to ensure an average zero CEV for each income
group when the GSEs are removed.
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Figure A6: Marginal tax rate in the data and in the model
61
Table A1: Distribution of rental housing supply
Wealth quintile group Percentage of total supply
Quintile 1 0
Quintile 2 11.9
Quintile 3 35.5
Quintile 4 20.2
Quintile 5 32.3
This table reports the percentage of total rental housing supply along the wealth distribution
in the benchmark economy with GSEs. Wealth quintile group refers to the households in the
quintile.
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Table A2: Welfare effects by household type of removing the GSEs (when taxes adjust)
Average CEV (%) Wealth quintile group
1 2 3 4 5 All
Renter 0.004 -0.227 -0.852 -0.968 — -0.094
High leveraged homeowner — -0.566 -0.267 — — -0.371
Low leveraged homeowner — — -0.001 0.286 0.464 0.211
No debt homeowner — — — 0.163 -0.048 0.020
All 0.004 -0.373 -0.225 0.227 -0.028 -0.078
This table reports the average Consumption Equivalent Variation (CEV) in percentages by
household type. It is positive when the household is better off without the GSEs. Low-leverage
homeowners are those with debt-to-value below the median debt-to-value in the benchmark
economy with GSEs. Wealth quintile group refers to the households in the quintile.
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Table A3: Welfare effects of removing the GSEs separating the rent and interest rate channels
Average Percentage
CEV (%) CEV > 0
By household type
Renter 0.385 88.1
High leveraged homeowner -0.328 7.56
Low leveraged homeowner 0.232 85.8
No debt homeowner 0.554 100
All 0.239 72.0
By wealth quintile
Quintile 1 0.511 100
Quintile 2 -0.122 37.3
Quintile 3 -0.191 23.3
Quintile 4 0.351 100
Quintile 5 0.647 100
This table reports the overall CEV numbers in Table 4 and Table A2 separated out from the
rent and interest rate channels. That is, the CEV is computed using only the other three
channels (credit risk subsidy, house price, and tax channels) in the decomposition (40). Wealth
quintile group refers to the households in the quintile.
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Table A4: Robustness analysis: Real estate fund
Variable Benchmark economy Real estate fund
(recalibrated)
With GSEs Change to With GSEs Change to
no-GSEs no-GSEs
Risk-free rate 1% -34.2bp 1% -14.7bp
Average implicit mortgage subsidy 44.7bp -44.7bp 47.3bp -47.3bp
Homeownership rate 68.5% -2.22% 66.3% -8.53%
Average debt-to-value mortgagors 58.1% -19.3% 56.8% -14.5%
Average mortgage spread 0.717% 22.1bp 0.662% 7.8bp
% of homeowners with debt 72.7 -6.87% 71.4 -11.1%
Housing stock-to-GDP ratio 4.21 -1.55% 4.34 -0.44%
Median deposit-to-asset ratio 25.7% -13.3% 33.1% 10.7%
House price 1 -1.16% 1 -0.11%
Shelter price 0.0299 3.18% 0.0281 2.64%
Price-to-rent ratio 33.4 -4.20% 35.6 -2.78%
Foreclosure rate (%) 1.14 -38.3bp 1.09 -68.5bp
This table studies the removal of the GSEs in the economy with a real estate fund of Section
7.1. For ease of exposition, the first two columns reproduce Table 3 for the case with rebates
via taxes. BP, basis points.
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Table A5: Robustness analysis: Constant deposit rates
Variable Benchmark economy Constant deposit rate
With GSEs Change to With GSEs Change to
no-GSEs no-GSEs
Risk-free rate 1% -34.2bp 1% 0bp
Average implicit mortgage subsidy 44.7bp -44.7bp 44.7bp -44.7bp
Homeownership rate 68.5% -2.22% 68.5% -0.78%
Average debt-to-value mortgagors 58.1% -19.3% 58.1% -19.8%
Average mortgage spread 0.717% 22.1bp 0.717% 13.2bp
% of homeowners with debt 72.7 -6.87% 72.7 -3.89%
Housing stock-to-GDP ratio 4.21 -1.55% 4.21 -3.91%
Median deposit-to-asset ratio 25.7% -13.3% 25.7% -4.71%
House price 1 -1.16% 1 -3.20%
Shelter price 0.0299 3.18% 0.0299 5.85%
Price-to-rent ratio 33.4 -4.20% 33.4 -8.55%
Foreclosure rate (%) 1.14 -38.3bp 1.14 -55.4bp
This table studies the removal of the GSEs in the economy with constant deposit rates of
Section 7.2. For ease of exposition, the first two columns reproduce Table 3 for the case with
rebates via taxes. BP, basis points.
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Table A6: Robustness analysis: Percentage of households that agree with removing the GSEs
Benchmark Real estate Constant
economy fund deposit rate
By household type
Renter 33.8 56.9 0.08
High leveraged homeowner 11.6 0.23 0.18
Low leveraged homeowner 78.3 68.6 73.5
No debt homeowner 63.2 80.6 99.6
All 43.9 55.3 40.4
By wealth quintile
Quintile 1 53.3 97.1 0
Quintile 2 0.20 16.5 0.20
Quintile 3 22.2 5.43 5.55
Quintile 4 89.5 77.5 95.8
Quintile 5 54.5 79.7 100
This table reports the percentage of households of a certain type that agree with removing the
GSEs, that is, the percentage with CEV> 0. Low-leverage homeowners are those with debt-to-
value below the median debt-to-value in the economy with GSEs. Wealth quintile group refers
to the households in the quintile.
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Table A7: Tax system parameters
n Cutoff income level (zn) Tax rate (tn)
1 0 0.10
2 0.22 0.15
3 0.90 0.25
4 1.81 0.28
5 1.81 0.33
6 2.76 0.35
7 5.58 0.396
Maximum deductible (ζ) 12.291
This table shows the normalized marginal tax rates, cutoff income levels, and maximum de-
ductible mortgage amount. These values are obtained from the tax schedule described in the
2013 IRS Form 1040 Instructions, Schedule Y-2, page 101. We converted all cutoff levels in the
units appropriate to our model using the median CPS wage earnings in 2013.
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